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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-LOSS OF CITIZENSHIP BY
NATURALIZED CITIZEN RESIDING ABROAD
The plaintiff, a German national by birth, became a naturalized
citizen of the United States.' In 1956, she married a German national,
and has resided in Germany since that time. In 1959, the plaintiff applied
for a passport to enter the United States, but the State Department re-
fused to issue her one, certifying that her citizenship had been lost under
section 352(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952.2
She sued for a declaratory judgment of her right to citizenship and for
an injunction to prevent enforcement of the act. HEn the district court,
a three judge panel,' one judge dissenting, ruled that her citizenship had
been lost.4 On appeal, held, reversed: section 352 (a) (1) of the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act bears no reasonable relationship to the power
of Congress to regulate foreign affairs, and discriminates against natu-
ralized citizens as a class in violation of fifth amendment due process
of law. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187 (1964).'
Although the Constitution provides that a person can acquire United
States citizenship by one of two methods,6 there is no provision in the
Constitution concerning the loss of citizenship. 7 Rather, Congress has
assumed the function of enacting specific conditions under which expa-
triation may occur.'
The first such enactment, in 1868,1 declared that the right of ex-
patriation was a natural and inherent right of all people. This provision
removed the necessity of the sovereign's consent to effect expatriation.' 0
1. 8 U.S.C. § 1431(a)(1) (1958).
2. 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(1) (1958), which provides that:
(a) A person who has become a national by naturalization shall lose his nation-
ality by-
(1) having a continuous residence for three years in the territory of a foreign
state of which he was formerly a national, or in which the place of his birth
is situated ...
Residence is defined in § 1101(a)(33) of the act, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1958), as a
person's actual dwelling place in fact, and contemplates a continuity of stay, but not
necessarily an uninterrupted physical presence in a foreign state.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1958), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (Supp. V, 1964), requires
a three-judge panel when a party seeks to enjoin the enforcement of a federal statute.
4. Schneider v. Rusk, 218 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1963).
5. The same question arose in an earlier case, but was never heard by the Supreme
Court on its merits. Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 860 (1949).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides: "All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside."
7. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963); United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 703 (1898).
8. For a history of cases and Congressional enactments, see Appleman, The Supreme
Court on Expatriation: An Historical Review, 23 FED. B.J. 351 (1963).
9. 15 Stat. 223 (1868).
10. 2 KF.NT, COMMENTARIES oN AmERICAN LAW 71-2 (14th ed. 1896).
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The Nationality Act of 190711 was the first statute to enumerate specific
acts for the commission of which a person could be expatriated. These
included naturalization in a foreign state and the taking of an oath of
allegiance to a foreign state. Under this act, a naturalized citizen was
presumed"2 to be expatriated if he resided for two years in the country
of his origin, or for five years in any other country. Further, an American
female who married a foreign national was deemed to have lost her
citizenship for the period of coverture.Y While the original bill did not
differentiate between native-born and naturalized citizens, 4 it was
amended before passage to apply only to naturalized citizens, 5 although
no valid reason was ever offered for this alteration."
The Nationality Act of 19401" expanded the categories of activity
which would result in loss of citizenship for both native-born and natu-
ralized citizens. 8 These were obtaining naturalization in a foreign state,
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, and entering or serving
in the armed forces of another state if the person was a national of that
state or naturalization was required for such service. Accepting employ-
ment in another state for which only nationals were eligible, voting in
a political election of a foreign state, and making a formal renunciation
of American citizenship in a foreign state were grounds for expatriation.
In addition, deserting the armed forces of the United States in time of
war if convicted by a court martial and subsequently dismissed or dis-
honorably discharged, and committing treason, bearing arms against or
attempting to overthrow the government by force, were grounds for
loss of citizenship. More significant, though, was the provision calling
for the automatic loss of citizenship of a naturalized citizen who resided
for three years in the country of his origin or for five years in any
other country.'" Congress was apparently persuaded, partially because of
the possibility of war, that expatriation of naturalized citizens residing
abroad was a necessary measure. These citizens supposedly "accumulated
wealth through the opportunities afforded in the United States," traveled
11. 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
12. "Provided however, [tihat said presumption may be overcome on the presentation
of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States ... ." Ibid.
"[W]e are prompted to say that it is a presumption easy to preclude and easy to over-
come." United States v. Gay, 264 U.S. 353, 358 (1924).
13. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), concerned this provision which was
repealed by 42 Stat. 1022 (1922).
14. Comment, Involuntary Loss of Citizenship by Naturalized Citizens Residing Abroad,
49 CORN LL L.Q. 52, 61-2 (1963).
15. 41 CONG. REC. 1463, 1464-65 (1907); 49 CORNELL L.Q. 52, 64 (1963).
16. 49 CORNELL L.Q. 52, n.91 (1963). Two ostensible reasons were that a naturalized
citizen who resides abroad is not really "one of us" and that a foreigner who does not
intend permanently to cast his lot with us should not be permitted to fraudulently
acquire protection of the American flag. 41 CONG. REc. 1463, 1464 (1907).
17. 54 Stat. 1137 (1940).
18. 54 Stat. 1168-69 (1940).
19. 54 Stat. 1170 (1940).
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abroad, spent their money abroad, bore no responsibilities of citizenship,
but nevertheless demanded the protection afforded! other citizens.2 0
Two 1944 amendments,21 applicable to native-born and naturalized
citizens, added as grounds for loss of citizenship remaining outside the
United States in time of war or national emergency for the purpose of
avoiding military training or service, and a formal renunciation of citi-
zenship in a foreign state in time of war.
With the exception of a 1954 amendment, 22 the! present law concern-
ing loss of citizenship is embodied in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,23 and is basically the same as its predecessors with respect
to the grounds for expatriation. This act no longer requires that an indi-
vidual who serves in the armed forces of another s;tate be a national of
that state in order to be expatriated,24 and raises a presumption that the
act of remaining outside the United States in time of war or national
emergency is for the purpose of avoiding military training or sevrice.26
The power of Congress to expatriate involuntarily has been upheld
on the basis of its power to regulate foreign affairs 6 and to raise armies
and navies.27 The exercise of this power, however, requires the existence
of a reasonable relationship between the means-withdrawl of citizen-
ship-and the end which is within the power of Congress to achieve.28
In Perez v. Brownell,29 a majority of the Court decided that voting in a
Mexican political election was connected sufficiently to the power of Con-
gress over foreign affairs to justify the loss of citizenship. The Court
reasoned that the citizen, by participating in such an election, could
encourage activities contrary to the interests of hi:; government. These
activities might be interpreted erroneously as official policies of the gov-
20. 86 CONG. REC. 11944 (1940) (remarks of Mr. Dickstein).
21. 58 Stat. 677, 746 (1940).
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(9) (1958), which provides for loss of citizenship if a person
is convicted of willfully advocating the overthrow of the United States government by
force. See 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
23. 8 U.S.C. § 1481, 1484 (1958); H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 305 (1952),
2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1743 (1952), indicates that the provisions which concerned
loss of citizenship by naturalized citizens were made part of the 1952 legislation without
adverse comment; see also Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1195 (1964).
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(3) (1958).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1958) (the same statute was held unconstitutional on
procedural grounds in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. Vg4 (1963), infra note 44).
26. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58 (1958); Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299,
311 (1915):
As a government the United States is invested with the attributes of sovereignty.
As it has the character of nationality, it has the powers of nationality, especially
those which concern its relations and intercourse with other countries.
27. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cls. 12, 13, 14; Kennedy v. Mendoi:a-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
159-60 (1963).
28. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1189 (1964); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,
60 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92-3 (1958).
29. 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
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ernment, and prove embarrassing in the conduct of foreign relations.80
The most recent case to uphold expatriation as an exercise of the foreign
relations power was United States ex rel. Marks v. Esperdy,3 1 in which
the Court concluded that service in Fidel Castro's revolutionary army
was more likely to have a deleterious effect on our relations with other
countries than voting in a foreign political election.32
In loss of citizenship cases, the Supreme Court has been able to
achieve little unanimity of philosophy. Three justices83 believe that
Congress has no power to expatriate a citizen against his will, and that
expatriation can be effected only by voluntary renunciation of nationality
and allegiance. 34 A majority of the Court has adopted the Perez85 view,
which requires that there be a reasonable relationship of loss of citizen-
ship to the Congressional power source.
In the instant case,36 a majority of five justices followed Perez,
reasoning that returning to one's country of origin for three years was
not likely to be a source of embarrassment to the conduct of foreign
relations serious enough to justify expatriation. 37 Equally important was
the Court's determination that the statute8 constituted invidious dis-
crimination against naturalized citizens as a class. Naturalized citizens
now will be able to reside abroad for unlimited periods of time without
fear of expatriation, and a highly criticized and unjust provision no
longer exists.3 In addition, this decision will prevent expatriation of
approximately fifteen-hundred naturalized citizens each year.4" Since
section 352(a)(1) 4x of the 1952 act has been declared invalid, section
352(a) (2)42 which imposes the same sanction for residence in any other
country for five years should be invalid under the same rationale.
30. Id. at 49, 59.
31. 315 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1963), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 84 Sup.
Ct. 1224 (1964).
32. Id. at 675, referring to the opinion of the lower court in 203 F. Supp. 389, 395
(S.D.N.Y. 1962).
33. Chief Justice Warren, and Justices Black and Douglas.
34. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1189 (1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 186 (1963); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 79-80 (1958) ; Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958).
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1189 (1964).
37. Id. at 1189, 1190. The court adopted the view of the dissenting district court
judge which indicated that the United States would have to bear the administrative burden
of protecting the rights of naturalized citizens who reside abroad.
38. Id. at 1190.
39. Report of the PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION 239
(1953). This report indicated that the provisions for loss of citizenship, which were limited
in their application to naturalized citizens, created a second class citizenship in the United
States. The committee felt that it was unfair for a native born citizen to be able to
reside abroad for an indefinite period of time, while a naturalized citizen could only remain
abroad for a maximum of five years.
•40. Comment, 49 CORNELL L.Q. 52, 53 (1963).
41. See note 2 supra.
42. 8 U.S.C. § 1484(a)(2) (1958).
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As pointed out by the majority opinion, 4  there are other limita-
tions on the power of Congress to expatriate a citizen against his will.
If the applicable statute is found to be penal in nature,4' rather than
regulatory, citizenship may not be taken away without fifth and sixth
amendment procedural safeguards. 4 Assuming that the statute is penal,
expatriation may be considered cruel and unusual punishment,46 although
this characterization has been limited so far to the person who has no
other nationality.47
Three justices48 emphasized, in dissent, the legislative history of
section 352, and stated that protection of naturalized citizens residing
abroad was a source of "international friction" in the conduct of foreign
relations. However, they offered no convincing reasons why residence
abroad of native-born citizens would not cause similar difficulties.
In an attempt to uphold the statute's discriminatory effect on the
rights of naturalized citizens, the dissenting justices pointed to wartime
situations and to cases in which aliens have been restricted in their
activities.50 However, neither of these factors seem particularly appro-
priate, because aliens do not have the same rights as citizens,5 1 the
country is not at war and because wartime restrictions have proved harsh
by comparison with peacetime regulations.52 The dissenting opinion has
43. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1190 (1964).
44. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963). Without conclusive
evidence of Congressional intent bearing on the nature of the statute, the court considers
the following factors: (1) whether the sanction involves a permanent disability or restraint;
(2) whether the sanction historically has been considered as p~enal; (3) whether scienter
is an element of the offense; (4) whether the statute seeks :retribution and deterrence;
(5) whether the behavior is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose can
be reasonably assigned to the provision; and (7) whether tLe consequence is excessive
in the light of the alternative assigned.
45. Id. at 167 ("a prior criminal trial and all its incidents, including indictment, notice,
confrontation, jury trial, assistance of counsel, and compulsory process for obtaining wit-
nesses").
46. U.S. CONST. amend VIII provides: "nor [shall] cruel and unusual punishment be
inflicted." In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02, 110 (1958), the court considered
expatriation under 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1958). This statui:e provided that a person
could lose his citizenship for desertion of the armed forces in time of war. The court
viewed expatriation as a destruction of the individual's political existence, which stripped
the citizen of his status in the national and international community. The court was also
influenced by what it termed the "unknowable" consequences of expatriation.
47. Trop v. Dulles, supra note 46, at 101, referring to the court of appeals opinion
in 239 F.2d 527, 530 (2d Cir. 1956): "[P]unitive expatriation of persons with no other
nationality constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and is iLnvalid as such."
48. Justices Clark, Harlan and White. Justice Brennan did not participate in the
decision.
49. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1192-93 (1964).
50. Id. at 1194.
51. Harisides v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 (1952): "[T]he alien in several
respects stands on an equal footing with citizens, but in others has never been conceded
legal parity with the citizen." See WASSERMAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PRACTICE 31 (1961)
for a reflection of the plenary power of Congress to exclude aliens.
52. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944):
Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its orivileges, and in time of war,
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merit in its suggestion that expatriation statutes are based on acts deemed
by Congress to indicate a lack of allegiance to the United States.53 With-
out the element of discrimination between native-born and naturalized
citizens, Congress probably could enact a statute, based on acts and
circumstances similar to the ones in the instant case, which would be
constitutional.
The instant case demonstrates the fact that a citizen can be expa-
triated against his will as long as the loss of citizenship bears a reasonable
relationship to the particular Congressional power source.54 The opinion
also indicates that strong evidence of that relationship will be necessary
to convince the Supreme Court of its existence,5" which is perhaps a
reflection of the Court's increasing reluctance to effect expatriation. The
foreign relations power cannot be used to expatriate a naturalized citizen
merely for living abroad for a stated period of time, and legislation in
this area which discriminates against naturalized citizens as a class will
not survive the requirement of fifth amendment due process of law. 5
MELVILLE DUNN
the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of large groups, of citizens
[Japanese] from their homes, except under circumstances of direst emergency
and peril, is inconsistent with our basic governmental institutions.
53. Schneider v. Rusk, 84 Sup. Ct. 1187, 1194 (1964).
54. Id. at 1189.
55. Id. at 1190.
56. Ibid.
